Yuan or not to Yuan? Yuan way to new monetary order

A ‘grown-up’ yuan means a more stable world economy

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

CHINESE New Year has come and will soon go. The eurozone debt crisis is well past two years. Yet uncertainty persists. The World Bank‘s January 2012 Global Economic Prospects reports:

“World economy has entered a very difficult phase characterised by significant downside risks and fragility and as a result, forecasts have been significantly downgraded. However, even achieving these much weaker outturns is very uncertain Overall, global economic conditions are fragile.”

This week’s IMF World Economic Outlook says more of the same: “The global recovery is threatened by intensifying strains in the euro area and fragilities elsewhere.” China, India, South Africa and Brazil have entered a slowing phase.

No country and no region can escape the consequences of a serious downturn. Nevertheless, growth in the East Asia and Pacific region (excluding Japan) is expected to slowdown to about 7.8% in 2012 (8.4% in 2011) and stabilise in 2013.

This reflects continuing strong domestic demand (evident in third quarter or 3Q 2011 GDP) while exports will slow to about 2% due to Europe heading towards recession and sluggish rich “Organisation For Economic Coercion And Direction (OECD)” demand.

The middle-income nations are, I think, in a good position to weather the global slowdown, with significant space available for fiscal relaxation, adequate room for interest rate easing, ample high reserves and rather strong underpinning for domestic demand to rise.

I see the modest easing in China’s growth being counterbalanced by a pick-up in GDP gains in 2013 over the rest of the region. Outside China, growth has slackened sharply to 4.8% in 2011 (6.9% in 2010), but is expected to strengthen in 2012, reaching 5.8% in 2013.

China

GDP growth in China, which accounts for 80% of the region, had eased to about 9.1% in 2011 (10.4% in 2010) and is expected to slacken further to a still robust 8.2%-8.4% in 2012.

The World Bank projections point to growth moderating at 8.3% in 2013, in line with its longer-term potential GDP. Expansion is expected to emanate from domestic demand, with private spending and fixed capital outlays contributing most of the growth in 2012.

For China, the health of the global economy and high-income Europe in particular, represents the key risk at this time. Domestic risks include property overheating, local government indebtedness, and bloating bank balance sheets.

The 4Q 2011 growth of 8.9% annoy investors who are looking for indications either weak enough to justify further policy easing or strong enough to allay fears of a hard landing. Bear in mind the forecast growth for 2012 will be the weakest in a decade, and may cool further as exports slump.

The Chinese economy is buffeted by two very different forces: (i) slow global growth will hurt Chinese exports (especially to its largest trading partner, European Union) which rose by 7% in December, and exporters foresee more trouble ahead; however, (ii) analysts point to strong retail sales (up 18% in December) reflecting rising wages and domestic spending which represented about 52% of GDP in the first quarter, higher than in 2009-11.

China is counting on its massive effort to build low-income “social housing” to provide enough demand to keep the real-estate market from collapsing.

It is unclear whether China can accelerate this program to build 36 million subsidised housing by 2015enough to house all of Germany’s households. But financial markets are anticipating worse news ahead. After all, the Shanghai Composite Index fell 21% in 2011. As the adage goes, stock analysts did forecast 10 of the past 3 recessions!

The yuan

Appreciation of the yuan (renmimbiRMB) against the US dollar in 2012 is expected to slow to about 3%, from +4.7% in 2011. The yuan closed at 6.3190 at end 2011, up about 8% compared with June 10 (when China effectively ended its 2-year long peg to the US dollar and has gained 30% since mid-2005 when it was last revalued.

The slowdown reflects growing demand for the US dollar amid uncertainty, lower growth, diminishing trade surplus, and growing US military presence in Asia, according to China’s Centre for Forecasting Science (of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) which reports directly to the State Council, China’s Cabinet.

Much of it will be in the latter year as China is likely to keep the yuan relatively stable in the first half to allow time to assess the impact of goings-on in the euro-zone. Dollars are pumped in via state banks, providing markets with a clear signal it will not allow the yuan to depreciate, while not in a hurry to let it appreciate either. The yuan has since moved sideways.

Off-shore yuan

To make the yuan a true reserve currency, China begun to liberalise currency controls and encourage an offshore yuan market in Hong Kong, creating an outlet for moving the currency across borders. However, foreign investors in China have been slow in using the yuan.

In practice, it is still difficult to buy & sell yuan because of paperwork & bureaucracy. It is still easier to settle in US dollar as it is the universal practice. Its convenience outweighs the potential costs of any unfavourable move in the US dollar-yuan rate. Nonetheless, China is encouraging more businesses to use the yuan and more US banks to step-up their yuan-settlement business.

This market will grow as China diligently moves to internationalise its currency. Encouraged by the authorities, a vibrant offshore yuan market has blossomed in Hong Kong. Beijing still controls the currency and how the yuan bought in Hong Kong can be brought back to China.

Yuan deposits in Hong Kong rose more than 4 times to 622.2b yuan (nearly US$100bil) at end September 2011 from a year earlier according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and now account for 10.4% of bank deposits.

Growth in offshore yuan stalled in late 2011 as China slowed its currency appreciation against the dollar. Given Beijing’s gradualist approach to reform, the market will soon revive.

An audience poll at the recent 2012 Asian Financial Forum in London indicated 63% believes full yuan convertibility is more than 5-years away.

The very fact that London wants to be a yuan-trading centre now says a lot. Only 10% of China’s international trade is settled in yuan, rising to 15% in 2012. It’s still a small market in the global context.

The yuan is used for just 0.29% of all global payments in November 2011 according to financial messaging network Swift. By comparison, the euro’s share is about 40%.

Dim-sum bonds

A booming business in dim-sum bonds (offshore yuan denominated bonds) followed, with companies including Caterpillar and McDonalds issuing such bonds. In September 2011, a spurt of capital flight towards “safe haven” assets in the US tied to the worsening debt crisis in Europe caused currencies of emerging nations to depreciate against the US dollar.

In East Asia, modest declines were recorded compared with South Africa (the rand fell 22%) and Brazil (the real dropped 18%). Only the Indonesia rupiah (down 5.8%) and the Malaysia ringgit (fell 5.4%) come under some pressure.

This event slowed the appreciation of the yuan and with it, trading in dim-sum bonds eased as investors were no longer in a hurry to invest. Over the medium-term, most analysts expect this yuan market to grow in the face of its massive US$3.18 trillion in reserves, as China moves to build its international status.

When dim-sum bonds started to hit the market in 2010, investors were enthusiastic, bidding up prices and driving down yields. But in the second half of 2011, the average price of investment grade dim-sum bonds fell 3.3%, amid a broad flight towards quality spooked by euro-zone turmoil and Chinese accounting scandals.

Bankers hope new entrants (private banks, commercial banks, mutual funds & life insurers) will give the market more stability this year. They would add depth & breath to the market, which tripled to 185b yuan (US$30bil) in dim-sum bonds issued in 2011. Expectations are for such bond issuance to reach 240 billion yuan this year, as new issuers (including more foreign companies) join early adopters such as government entities & state run banks.

This offshore bond market has developed well over the past year. Investor diversification in both types & geographics is still evolving, which is key to the healthy growth of the market. Equally important, investors look to the continuing appreciation of the yuan.

In addition, its average yield has risen to 3.8% (from 2.35% since mid 2011) and most now trade at higher yields than comparable US dollar bonds.

This rise in yields reflects expectation for (i) slower yuan appreciation; (ii) increase in supply; and (iii) investors desire for a higher liquidity premium during market downturns. Overall, the dim-sum market is turning into a buyer’s market.

Bilateral arrangements

China is forging ahead in laying the groundwork to internationalise the yuan via bilateral arrangements with foreign companies, nations & financial centers, particularly Hong Kong (mainly because it can fully control the terms of the market). More mainland-based financial institutions will be able to issue yuan denominated bonds in Hong Kong.

This is part of a broader effort, first started in July 2009 when it encouraged enterprises in Shanghai & Guangzhou province to use the yuan when settling trade with Hong Kong, Macau and some foreign companies (see my column “China: RMB Flexibility Not Enough” of July 3, 2010).

The post-X’mas direct yuan-yen trade deal forms part of a wide-ranging currency arrangement between China & Japan to give the use of the yuan a big boost. After all, China is Japan’s largest trading partner with 26.5 trillion yen in 2-way transactions last year. Encouraging direct settlement in bypassing the US dollar would reduce currency risks and trading costs. Also, Japan will buy up to US$10bil in yuan bonds for its reserves even though it represents no more than 1% of Japan’s US$1.3 trillion reserves. And, it is now easier for companies to convert Chinese and Japanese funds directly into each other without an intermediate conversion to US dollar. About 60% of China-Japan trade is settled in US dollar, a well-established practice.

The package allows Japan backed institutions to sell yuan bonds in the mainland (instead of Hong Kong) helping to open China’s capital market.

In recent weeks, China has taken new steps to promote the use of yuan overseas, including allowing foreign firms to invest yuan accumulated overseas in mainland China; widening the People’s Bank of China (its central bank) network of currency swaps with other central banks to enable their banks to supply yuan to their customers, including with Thailand, South Korea and New Zealand totalling 1.2 trillion yuan.

It already has completed arrangements with the big Asean counterparts. Berry Eichengreen (University of California at Berkeley) observed: “Japan appears to be acknowledging implicitly that there will be a single dominant Asian currency in the future and it won’t be the yen.”

But Harvard’s Jeffrey Frankel is more down to earth: “This hastens a multicurrency world, but this is just one of 100 steps along the way.”

China still has a way to go in: (i) getting the yuan fully convertible (ii) reducing exchange rate interventions (iii) liberalising interest rates, and (iv) reforming the banking system. In all, so the yuan can really trade freely.

What to do?

The China-Japan deal points the way, nudging the yuan towards the inevitable becoming a reserve currency alongside now discredited US dollar and the euro. This is to be welcomed by all.

China must realise a fully internationalised yuan should be free to float (and to appreciate) part of its overall reform. Over the longer term, though, avoiding huge imbalances is good for everyone, not least China. While it is understandable for its Prime Minister to label China today as “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable,” opportunities to take advantage of new openings don’t come often.

Alexander Gerschenkron, my professor at Harvard (in my view, the best economic historian of his time) points to economies like China as having “advantages in backwardness,” including China’s ability to weather shocks: high reserves, robust fiscal situation and comfortable external position.

Shakespeare’s Hamlet sums it up best: “If it be not now, yet it will come – the readiness is all.” A grown-up yuan is good for China’s welfare.

It also means a more stable world economy which benefits the United States. For China, there will never be enough cushion. Politicians need to seize the moment and act boldly.

● Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching & promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my

To Yuan or not to Yuan, that is the question  

The government of Zimbabwe is considering using China’s Yuan as their national currency.

China has reportedly been offered mining rights by Mugabe, despite protests [EPA]

Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - From downtown shops that stock cheap clothing and shoes that fall apart after one wear, to mining concessions in platinum, gold and diamonds – the Chinese finger is now in virtually every Zimbabwean pie.

From city sidewalks to low-income suburbs, the Chinese have become part of the local population, and if some senior government bureaucrats have their way, the country could soon find itself adopting the Chinese Yuan as its official currency.

For some influential monetary policy czars, the massive assailing of the Zimbabwean economy by the Chinese now only requires the Yuan to strengthen these economic reconstruction efforts.

Invited by President Robert Mugabe as part of his infamous 2004 “Look East” policy to help drive the economy and employment creation, after relations with former traditional investment partners the European Union and United States soured, China has been able to create its own little sphere of influence and establish an ubiquitous presence in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe looks to China for economic revival

This is despite being unpopular with Zimbabwe’s industrial and commercial players – and general members of the public who accuse the Chinese of poor labour practices and shoddy goods and services.

Late in 2011, Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, seen by many as a close ally of Mugabe, announced he was in favour of having the Chinese Yuan as the country’s official currency. After the Zimbabwean dollar was suspended in 2008, the country has been using a multi-currency regime, which includes the use of the US dollar, the South African rand and the Botswana pula.

According to Gono, the Chinese Yuan would be introduced alongside the Zimbabwean dollar. Mugabe’s political supporters have been calling for currency reforms to bring back the Zimbabwean dollar.

“With the continuous firming of the Chinese Yuan, the US dollar is fast ceasing to be the world’s reserve currency and the eurozone debt crisis has made things even worse,” Gono told state media in November.

“As a country, we still have the opportunity to avoid being caught napping, by adopting the Chinese Yuan as part of consolidating the country’s ‘Look East’ policy.

“It’s only recently when we had the startling revelations, with Angola offering to bail out her former colonial master Portugal from her debt crisis. This can also happen with Zimbabwe if we choose the right path,” Gono added.

He continued: “If we continue with our ‘Look East’ policy, it will not be long [until] we will also be volunteering to bail out Britain from her debt crisis, and I will not wait for my creator’s day before this happens. There is no doubt that the Yuan, with its ascendancy, will be the 21st century’s world reserve currency.”

‘Handing over’ the country?

Officials from Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front see huge potential in using the Yuan, citing the growth of the Chinese economy under BRICS, which brings together emerging global economic powerhouses Brazil, India, China and South Africa.

But not everyone is as upbeat about such prospects.

There are concerns that this could mean “handing over” the country to the Chinese, who already have been offered huge mining rights by Mugabe – despite protests from his coalition government partners. The country’s finance minister, Tendai Biti, has said that Mugabe was forfeiting state resources to China, whom critics are calling “Africa’s new coloniser”.

Economist Eric Bloch said “it is not practical” for Zimbabwe to adopt the Chinese Yuan.

“Zimbabwe won’t have any interaction with international markets, as the US dollar remains the standard currency in international trade,” Bloch explained.

With China increasingly being touted to overtake the US as the world’s largest economy, the temptation to embrace all things Chinese has proven too much to resist for poor economies across the globe, contends Tafara Zivanayi, an economics lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe.

“There has been false hope given to Chinese economic growth, with many African countries imagining they can transfer this growth to their own economies,” Zivanayi said.

“Such decisions (to adopt a foreign currency) as usually based on international trade indices and monetary policies of the country where the currency is domiciled. Even if there have been projections that the Chinese economy will surpass the US economy, this won’t happen overnight,” Zivanayi said.

“There are still concerns about Chinese penetration of international, especially low income, markets and creating wealth for itself and not host countries,” Zivanayi said.

Even traders who have long ridiculed cheap Chinese products and have no grasp of international trade intricacies find themselves offering opinions about the prospects of adopting the Chinese Yuan.

“As long as things have worked fine for us using the American dollar, why change that formula?” asked Thabani Moyo, a commuter omnibus driver. His colleagues, who are struggling to handle giving change in the basket of currencies they receive, nodded in agreement.

Gono and other opponents of US currency cited this lack of change in coins as a reason why Zimbabwe needed to adopt a single currency or revert to its own, previously useless, dollar.

However, during the presentation of the national budget for the 2012 fiscal year, Biti told parliament that Zimbabwe would continue using US currency until the economy stabilised.

Not everyone supports the introduction of the Chinese Yuan. “We want real money, not zhing-zhong,” taxi driver Jourbet Buthelezi said, referring to the pejorative term Zimbabweans use for sub-standard Chinese goods.

A version of this article was first published on Inter Press Service.

Source: IPS

The Exchange Rate Delusion of US Trade Deficit !

Michael Spence: The Exchange-Rate Delusion

A 100 yuan banknote (R) is placed next to a US$100 banknote. — PHOTO : REUTERS >>

If one looks at the trade patterns of the global economy’s two biggest players, two facts leap out.

One is that, while the United States runs a trade deficit with almost everyone, including Canada, Mexico, China, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, not to mention the oil-exporting countries, the largest deficit is with China.

If trade data were re-calculated to reflect the country of origin of various components of value-added, the general picture would not change, but the relative magnitudes would: higher US deficits with Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, and a dramatically lower deficit with China.

The second fact is that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – all relatively high-income economies – have a large trade surplus with China. Germany has relatively balanced trade with China, even recording a modest bilateral surplus in the post-crisis period.

The US has a persistent overall trade deficit that fluctuates in the range of 3-6 per cent of GDP. But, while the total reflects bilateral deficits with just about everyone, the US Congress is obsessed with China, and appears convinced that the primary cause of the problem lies in Chinese manipulation of the renminbi’s exchange rate.

One problem with this view is that it cannot account for the stark differences between the US and Japan, Germany, and South Korea. Moreover, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the renminbi is now rising quickly, owing to inflation differentials and Chinese wage growth, particularly in the country’s export sectors. That will shift the Chinese economy’s structure and trade patterns quite dramatically over time.

The final-assembly links of global-value added chains will leave China for countries at earlier stages of economic development, such as Bangladesh, where incomes are lower (though without producing much change in the balance with the US).

A somewhat more sensible concern might be that the dollar’s reserve-currency status causes it to be ‘over-valued’ with respect to every currency, not just the renminbi. That could create additional pressure on the tradable part of the US economy, and thus might help to explain why the US tradable sector has not generated net employment for two decades.

But, in order to explain performance relative to Japan and Germany, one would have to argue that the euro and the yen have been undervalued, which makes no sense.

In fact, the employment generated by the tradable sector has been in services at the upper end of the distributions of value-added per person, education, and income. As a result, growth and employment in the tradable sector have gone separate ways, with healthy growth and stagnant employment. In Germany, by contrast, the tradable sector is an employment engine. The same is true of Japan.

The US economy’s distinctive features for at least a decade prior to the crisis that began in 2008 were an unsustainably high level of consumption, owing to an illusory wealth effect, under-investment (including in the public sector), and savings that fell short of the investment deficiency. That excess household and government consumption fueled the domestic economy – and much of the global economy as well.

In several European countries that now confront fiscal and growth challenges, the pattern was somewhat different: most of the excess consumption and employment was on the government side. But the effect was similar: an unsustainable pattern of income and employment generation, and lower productivity and competitiveness in these economies’ tradable sectors, leading to trade deficits, stunted GDP, and weak job creation.

One could argue that the euro has been and still is overvalued, and that this has hindered many eurozone economies’ productivity relative to non-eurozone countries. But the relative productivity deficiencies within the eurozone are more important for growth, and have nothing to do with the exchange rate.

Excessive Focus on currencies

The focus on currencies as a cause of the West’s economic woes, while not entirely misplaced, has been excessive. Developing countries have learned over time that real income growth and employment expansion are driven by productivity gains, not exchange-rate movements. This, in turn, requires public and private investment in tangible assets, physical and telecommunications infrastructure, human capital and skills, and the knowledge and technology base of the economy.

Of course, it is possible for a country’s terms of trade to get out of line with income and productivity levels, requiring a rebalancing. But resetting the terms of trade is no substitute for tackling the structural underpinnings of productivity.

None of this is peculiar to developing countries. Underinvestment has long-term costs and consequences everywhere. Excess consumption merely hides these costs temporarily.

In the US, productivity deficiencies have led to a pattern of disconnection from global supply chains. So the challenge for America is not only to restore productivity, but also to restore its links to the main currents of world trade.

China’s growth – and, more generally, that of the major emerging economies – provides a substantial potential tailwind. That is certainly true nowadays for Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The US and others can take advantage of it as well, but only if productivity relative to income levels in specific areas of potential competitiveness begin to rise.

As long as America economic policy remains focused primarily on deficits, domestic demand, exchange rates, and backsliding on trade openness, its investment deficiencies will remain unaddressed. That means that its employment and income-distribution problems will remain unaddressed as well.

The good news is that, at a deep level, incentives across advanced and developing countries are aligned. The emerging economies would like nothing more than the restoration of sustainable patterns of growth in the advanced economies, and are prepared to be cooperative players in that process. But focusing on these countries’ exchange rates is not the right way to go about it.

Michael Spence, a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor of Economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. His latest book is The Next Convergence – The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World (www.thenextconvergence.com).

China bashing not the solution !

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GLOBAL TRENDS By MARTIN KHOR

The US Senate is scheduled to vote this week on a “currency Bill” to allow actions against China’s imports. But blaming China may unleash a trade war without solving America’s problems.

IS China’s currency and trade performance a threat to the United States? Or are American politicians using China as a scapegoat for the country’s economic problems?

“China bashing” has been on the rise in the United States. It is widely thought that politicians of both parties are doing it to gain popularity in view of the coming elections.

For some years, Congress members have threatened to take action against Chinese imports to retaliate against what they see as China’s manipulation of its currency level.

The politicians say that the Chinese yuan is lower than what it should be if there were no government intervention.

They charge that the undervalued currency enables China to have a large trade surplus vis-a-vis the United States, and that this has caused the loss of American jobs.

These charges are refuted by the Chinese government, which argues that the US trade deficit is due to domestic factors and not Chinese policy. It also points to the 7% appreciation of the yuan versus the dollar in recent months.

This issue has been a central economic policy issue between the two major countries. It could escalate into a major battle on the ground.

The US Senate is scheduled to vote tomorrow on a Bill aimed at enabling import tariffs to be placed on Chinese imports as a retaliation against the alleged currency manipulation.

In a first step, the Senate on Oct 3 voted 79-19 to allow a week-long debate on the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011. The Bill mandates a process for imposing tariffs on imports of a country with allegedly “misaligned currencies”.

Though China is not named, it is obviously the target. The Bill would in effect require the US Treasury Department to determine if China was manipulating the yuan. If it finds this to be the case, extra tariffs can be placed on some imported Chinese goods.

The Bill is expected to pass in the Senate. But a similar Bill has to also go through the House of Representatives, and be approved by US President Barack Obama, before trade measures can be taken.

These two steps are far from assured. Although it seems the majority of the House are in favour, Speaker John Boehner said last week it was dangerous to be moving legislation through Congress to force “someone to deal with the value of their currency … while I’ve got concerns about how the Chinese have dealt with their currency, I’m not sure this is the way to fix it”.

Obama last Thursday accused China of “gaming” the trade system to the disadvantage of other countries, especially the United States. But he also expressed concern that the Senate Bill “may not actually work … as it may be only ‘symbolic’, and would probably not be upheld by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)”.

Nevertheless, the probability of the passage of the Senate Bill has heightened US-China tensions and raised the potential of a serious trade war.

As could be expected, Chinese government agencies and think tanks are reacting strongly to what they perceive as a protectionist move.

The People’s Bank of China (its central bank) said the Senate Bill would not help resolve the United States’ domestic issues such as the trade deficit, low level of savings and high unemployment, but could potentially affect the economy and market confidence.

It added: “The passage of the Bill may seriously affect China’s currency reforms, potentially leading to a trade war between the two sides.”

Xu Mingqi, deputy director of the Institute of the World Economy at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, had this to say: “It is easy for the US to make China a scapegoat of its domestic problems at a time when its economy remains weak with a high unemployment rate and the next general election only 13 months away.”

In the event the Senate Bill makes its way into actual law, a dispute case will most likely be taken against the United States at the WTO.

WTO rules do not allow countries to impose punitive duties on the basis that a certain country’s currency is undervalued. That this is so is appropriate. Valuing currencies to see if they are “manipulated” is very complex and difficult.

For example, the United States has also been accused of pushing its currency down through its controversial policy of “quantitative easing” (central bank pumping of funds into the banking system).

And is Switzerland “manipulating” its currency by announcing it will not tolerate further appreciation of the franc?

Allowing the currency issue to be a subject of possible unfair practice open to trade sanctions will open the road to many other issues being similarly recognised, such as a country’s tax rates, interest rates, and labour and environmental standards. There will be no end to having reasons for new trade protectionism.

A US law based on the Senate Bill will probably be found to be inconsistent with US obligations in the WTO. But by the time the WTO dispute system panel makes a final ruling (this may take years), some damage may already be done should the United States act against Chinese imports in the meantime.

China may not take the US actions lying down, and can come up with retaliatory action on US goods. Thus, a trade war may be unleashed.

Interestingly, although some well known American economists like Paul Krugman and Fred Bergsten advocate US action against Chinese imports, some business associations as well as important newspapers like the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Financial Times have come out strongly against the Senate Bill for its protectionism and trade war potential.

The high-pitched attack on China because of its large trade surplus with the United States is misplaced. Little of the gross surplus actually accrues to China.

A 2010 paper by the South Centre shows that only a small part of China’s exports to the United States is actually retained as income in China.

For example, in 2005, China’s gross trade surplus with the United States was US$172bil (RM543bil), but in value-added terms (what is earned by the respective countries after deducting the import content of their exports), it was only US$40bil (RM126bil).

Further, a large part of the Chinese trade surplus in value-added terms was earned by foreign firms in China and thus, does not belong to China. As a result, income left in China was no more than 30% of the total value of exports to the United States.

Therefore, the criticism that China enjoys extraordinarily high trade surpluses with the United States is misplaced.

Also, even if US trade measures reduce Chinese imports into the United States, this does not mean that the US import bill will be reduced.

Goods from other developing countries such as Vietnam or Indonesia may just replace the Chinese goods.

Therefore, US actions based on the Senate Bill would hardly help the United States get rid of its trade deficit.

It is best that the United States take domestic actions to address its domestic economic problems, rather than make a scapegoat of other countries and potentially unleash new trade wars.

Currency War & Exchange RatesTension!

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Tension over exchange rates

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

Amid heightened fears over eurozone sovereign debt risks and increasing concerns about the health of the United States and eurozone economies, worried investors have flocked to the safety of haven currencies, especially the Swiss franc, and gold.

While investors and speculators have since moved aggressively to buy gold, the switch from being large sellers to buying by a number of emerging nation’s central banks (Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Thailand) has helped propel the price of gold more than 25% higher this year, hitting a record US$1,920 a troy ounce earlier this month. At a time of high uncertainty in the face of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) latest gloomy forecast on global growth, few central banks relish the prospect of a flood of international cash pushing their currencies higher.

Massive over-valuation of their currencies poses an acute threat to their economic well-being, and carries the risk of deflation.

The Swiss franc

Switzerland’s national currency, the CHF, should be used to speculative attacks by now. So much so in the 1970s, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) was forced to impose negative interest rates on foreign investors (who have to pay banks to accept their CHF deposits).

And, it has been true in recent years, with the CHF rising by 43% against the euro since the start of 2010 until mid-August this year. There does not seem to be an alternative to the CHF as a safe haven at the moment.

With what’s going on in the United States, eurozone and Japan, investors have lost faith in the world’s two other haven currencies: US dollar (USD) and the yen.

This reflects the Federal Reserves’ ultra-loose policy stance and the political fiscal impasse in the United States which have scared away investments from the dollar. The prospect that Tokyo might once again intervene to limit the yen’s strength has deterred speculators from betting on further gains from it. To be fair, the CHF has also benefitted from recent signs that the Swiss economy, thanks in large part to its close ties to a resurgent Germany, is thriving.

But enough is enough. SNB made a surprising announcement on Sept 6 that it would buy foreign currencies in “unlimited quantities” to combat a huge over-valuation of the CHF, and keep the franc-euro exchange rate above 1.20 with the “utmost determination.”

On Aug 9, the CHF reached a new record, touching near parity against the euro from 1.25 at the start of the year, while the USD sank to almost CHF 0.70 (from 0.93). The impact so far has been positive: the euro rose 8% on that day and the 1.20 franc level had since stabilised. It was a gamble.

Of course, SNB had intervened before in 2009 and 2010, but in a limited way at a time when the euro was far stronger. But this time, with the nation’s economy buckling under the currency’s massive over-valuation, the risks of doing nothing were far greater. In July last year, following a chequered history of frustrated attempts, SNB vowed it would not intervene again. By then, the central bank was already awash with foreign currency reserves. Worse, the CHF value of these reserves plunged as the currency strengthened. In 2010, SNB recorded a loss of CHF20 billion, and a further CHF10 billion in 1H’11. As a result, SNB came under severe political pressure for not paying the expected dividend. But exporters also demanded further intervention to stop the continuing appreciation.

This time, SNB is up against a stubborn euro-debt crisis which just won’t go away. True, recent efforts have been credible. Indeed, the 1.20 francs looks defensible, even though the CHF remains over-valued. Fair value appears to be closer to 1.30-1.40. But inflation is low; still, the risk of asset-price bubbles remains. What’s worrisome is SNB acted alone. For the European Central Bank (ECB), the danger lies in SNB’s eventual purchases of higher quality German and French eurozone government bonds with the intervention receipts, countering the ECB’s own intervention in the bond market to help weaker members of Europe’s monetary union, including Italy and Spain.

This causes the spread between the yields of these bonds to widen, and pile on further pressure on peripheral economies. Furthermore, unlimited Swiss buying of euro would push up its value, adding to deflationary pressures in the region.

The devil’s trade-off

As I see it, the Swiss really has no other options. SNB has been attempting to drive down the CHF by intervening in the money markets but with little lasting effect. “The current massive over-valuation of the CHF poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy,” where exports accounted for 35% of its gross domestic product. The new policy would help exports and help job security. As of now, there is no support from Europe to drive the euro higher.

SNB is caught in the “devil’s trade-off,” having to choose risking its balance sheet rather than risk “mounting unemployment, deflation and economic damage.” The move is bound to cause distortions and tension over exchange rates globally.

New haven: the Nokkie’

SNB’s new policy stance has sent ripples through currency markets. In Europe, it drove the Norwegian krone (Nokkie) to an eight-year high against the euro as investors sought out alternative safe havens. Since money funds must have a minimum exposure in Europe and, with most European currencies discredited and quality bonds yielding next to nothing, the Nokkie became a principal beneficiary. It offers 3% return for three-month money-market holdings.

Elsewhere, the Swedish krona also gained ground, rising to its strongest level against the euro since June after its central bank left its key interest rates unchanged, while signalling that the rate will only creep up. What’s worrisome is that if there is continuing upward pressure on the Nokkie or the krona, their central banks would act, if needed with taxes and exchange controls. With interest rates at or near zero and fiscal policy exhausted or ruled out politically in the most advanced nations, currencies remain one of the only policy tools left.

At a time of high uncertainty, investors are looking for havens. Apart from gold and some real assets, few countries would welcome fresh inflows which can stir to over-value currencies. Like it or not, speculative capital will still find China and Indonesia particularly attractive.

Yen resists the pressure

SNB’s placement of a “cap” to weaken the CHF has encouraged risk-adverse investors who sought comfort in the franc to turn to the yen instead. So far, the yen has stayed below its record high reached in mid-August. But it remains well above the exporters’ comfort level.

Indeed, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has signalled its readiness to ease policy to help as global growth falters. But so far, the authorities are happy just monitoring and indications are they will resist pressure to be as bold as the Swiss, for three main reasons: (i) unlike to CHF, the yen is not deemed to be particularly strong at this time it’s roughly in line with its 30-year average; (ii) unlike SNB, Japan is expected to respect the G-7′s commitment to market determined exchange rates; and (iii) Japan’s economy is five times the size of Switzerland and the yen trading volume makes defending a pre-set rate in the global markets well-nigh impractical.

Still, they have done so on three occasions over the past 12 months: a record 4.51 trillion yen sell-off on Aug 9 (surpassing the previous daily record of 2.13 trillion yen from Sept 2010).

The operation briefly pushed the USD to 80.25 yen (from 77.1 yen) but the effects quickly waned and the dollar fell back to a record low of 75.9 yen on Aug 19. But, I gather the Finance Ministry needs to meet three conditions for intervention: (a) the yen/USD rate has to be volatile; (b) a simultaneous easing by BoJ; and (c) intervention restricted to one day only.

Given these constraints, it is no wonder MOF has failed to arrest the yen’s underlying trend. In the end, I think the Japanese has learnt to live with it unlike the Swiss who has the motivation and means to resist a strong currency.

Reprieve for the yuan

I sense one of the first casualties of the failing global economic expansion is renewed pressure to further appreciate the yuan. For China, August was a good month to adjust strong exports, high inflation and intense international pressure. As a result, the yuan appreciated against the USD by more than 11%, up from an average of about 5% in the first seven months of the year. However, the surge had begun to fade in the first half of September.

But with the United States and eurozone economic outlook teetering in gloom, China’s latest manufacturing performance had also weakened, reflecting falling overseas demand.

This makes imposing additional currency pressure on exporters a no-go. Meanwhile, inflation has stabilised. Crude oil and imported food prices have declined, reducing inflationary pressure and the incentive to further appreciate the yuan. Looks like September provided a period of some relief. But, make no mistake, the pressure is still there. The fading global recovery may have papered over the cracks. Pressure won’t grind to a halt.

Central banks instinctively try to ward-off massive capital flows appreciating their currencies. There are similarities between what’s happening today, highlighted by the recent defensive move by SNB, and the tension over exchange rates at last year-end. It’s an exercise in pushing the problem next door.

This can be viewed as a consequence of recent Japanese action (Tokyo’s repeated intervention to sell yen). It threatens to start a chain of responses where every central bank tries to weaken its currency in the face of poor global economic prospects and growing uncertainty. So far, the tension has not risen to anything like last year’s level. But with rising political pressure provoking resistance to currency appreciation, the potential for a fresh outbreak remains real. The Brazilian Finance Minister just repeated his warning last year that continuing loose US monetary policies could stoke a currency war.

Growing stress

With the euro under growing stress from sovereign debt problems, the market’s focus is turning back to Japan (prompting a new plan to deal with a strong yen), to non-eurozone nations (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and possibly the United Kingdom) and on to Asia (already the ringgit, rupiah, baht and won are coming under pressure on concerns over uncertainty and capital flight). Similarly, Brazil’s recent actions to limit currency appreciation highlights the dilemma faced by fast growing economies (Turkey, Chile and Russia) since allowing currency appreciation limits domestic overheating but also undermines competitiveness.

This low level currency war between emerging and advanced economies had further unsettled financial markets.

Given the weak economic outlook, most governments would prefer to see their currencies weaken to help exports. The risk, as in the 1930s, is not just “beggar-thy-neighbour” devaluations but resort to a wide range of trade barriers as well. Globally co-ordinated policies under G-20 are preferred. But that’s easier said than done.

So, it is timely for the IMF’s September “World Economic Outlook” to warn of “severe repercussions” to the global economy as the United States and eurozone could face recession and a “lost decade” of growth (a replay of Japan in the 90s) unless nations revamped economic policies. For the United States, this means less reliance on debt and putting its fiscal house in order.

For the eurozone, firm resolution of the debt crisis, including strengthening its banking system. For China, increased reliance on domestic demand. And, for Brazil, cooling an over-heating economy. This weekend, the G-20 is expected to take-up global efforts to rebalance the world overwhelmed by heightened risks to growth and the deepening debt crisis. Focus is expected on the role of exchange rates in rebalancing growth, piling more pressure on China’s yuan.

Frankly, IMF meetings and G-20 gatherings don’t have a track record of getting things done. I don’t expect anything different this time. The outlook just doesn’t look good.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.

Capital controls: From heresy to orthodoxy

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THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG

Principles for formulating capital control policies must take local conditions into account.

ON Sept 1, 2011, it would be 13 years to the day when Malaysia first introduced capital controls to stem the effects of the Asian financial crisis on the domestic economy. In 1998, it was heresy to introduce capital controls on capital flows, since it was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) orthodoxy to liberalise the capital account.

From the perspective of history, one tends to forget that in 1945, when the IMF was first established, the consensus opinion among bankers and academics alike was for hot money to be controlled. Indeed, the intellectual father of the IMF, John Maynard Keynes, remarked that “what used to be heresy is now endorsed as orthodoxy.”

In the old days, courtesy to living persons and the statute of limitations would allow history to be written only after 60 years when official archives are opened to the public.

Today, we live in an age of unfettered information, when oral and documented history can be published rapidly, from authorised biographies issued shortly after a leader leaves office to unauthorised leakages from Wikileaks.

The publication of a new book by Datuk Wong Sulong, former group chief editor of The Star, called Notes to the Prime Minister: the Untold Story of How Malaysia Beat the Currency Speculators, only two months after the IMF announced in April 2011 new thinking on capital inflows, is a remarkable achievement.

Sixty-six years after the IMF was formed, capital controls have moved full circle from orthodoxy to heresy and back again to (qualified) orthodoxy.

The book comprises 45 Notes written by Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, between Oct 3, 1997 and Aug 21, 1998 to then Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad.

In short, they were the key briefs that helped Dr Mahathir make up his mind on the key economic policies to help combat the Asian financial crisis.

Book offers deep insights

For both historians and practicing policymakers, this new book offers deep insights into the serendipity and the practice of successful policy decision-making. There is an element of serendipity, because Dr Mahathir recalled that he spotted Nor Mohamed walking down a street in Kuala Lumpur just before he left for Buenos Aires in September 1997 via Hong Kong, where he attended the World Bank Annual Meetings and clashed publicly with George Soros on currency trading.

On Sept 29, 1997, he summoned Nor Mohamed to meet him in Buenos Aires, because he needed someone who understood currency trading. It is a tribute to a politician trained as a doctor that he was willing to spend repeated sessions with an experienced currency trader to understand the intricacies of modern financial markets.

Reading the 45 Notes in historical sequence, one gets a far better appreciation of how the decision to impose capital controls was arrived at. The Notes not only have historical value, but also current-day applicability, as they explain not only offshore currency, the psychology of fear and greed that drive markets, but also market manipulation in thinly traded emerging market currencies.

The major problem of the proponents of the Washington Consensus in 1997 was that most of them were macro-economists who had little understanding or experience of how the markets actually worked. Free markets became a dogma and objective in their own right, rather than the means to an end for better livelihood for all.

The Notes also revealed that in complex decisions under uncertainty, it was vital to understand clearly the key parameters for action. Note 7 clearly pointed out that Malaysia was different from other countries under currency attack because it did not have large short-term external debt. Note 11, dated Oct 21, 1997, spelt out the factors that determined exchange rates, with a particularly illuminating explanation of market manipulation.

Market manipulation was seen as due to concerted effort by hedge funds, using large gearing and available tools and then triggering the element of fear among the long-term investors who have legitimate currency risk.

In other words, if the wolves can trigger the herd to move, then the fundamentals can move. The perception of fear changes the whole game.

Effect of CLOB

Note 39 dated July 9, 1998 is an important study of the effect on Malaysia of the central limit order book (CLOB) for trading of Malaysian shares in Singapore. The Note identified that the CLOB was a convenient way for capital outflows.

Hence, one of the most effective ways for exchange control was to impose the condition that Malaysian shares could only be traded on a Malaysian exchange, which came on Aug 31, 1998, with exchange controls imposed on the following day.

In Dr Mahathir’s words, “during the financial crisis, we faced two parallel situations; the ringgit was falling rapidly and Malaysian shares were also falling rapidly. So we had to put an end to both.”
Image via Wikipedia
The IMF has come out with six key principles for formulating capital control policies.

The first is that there is no “one-size-fits-all” policy mix. The second is that capital controls should fit long-term structural reforms. Third, capital controls are only one tool and not a substitute for the right macro policies. Fourth, capital controls can be used on a case-by-case basis, in appropriate circumstances. Fifth, the medicine should treat the ailment, and finally, the policy must consider its effect on other market participants.

It is hard to argue against these common sense “motherhood” principles. The trick in real life policy-making is how to apply them to local conditions.

On of the features of the current Chinese capital controls is that China also has a large amount of Chinese shares listed outside capital controls, such as Chinese shares listed in Hong Kong, Singapore and New York.

This is a book that is a must read for all emerging market policymakers interested in liberalising their capital accounts and for IMF experts to ponder emerging market experience.

I recommend that this new book be translated into Chinese, so that Chinese policymakers interested in internationalising the renminbi can look at the Malaysian experience.

Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is author of the book, From Asian to Global Financial Crisis.

Related post:

The untold story of Malaysia foreign exchange controls

China’s US$3.2 trillion headache

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ENTER THE DRAGON By YAO YANG

WHILE the downgrade of US government debt by Standard & Poor’s shocked global financial markets, China has more reason to worry than most: the bulk of its US$3.2 trillion in official foreign reserves more than 60% is denominated in dollars, including US$1.1 trillion in US Treasury bonds.

So long as the US government does not default, whatever losses China may experience from the downgrade will be small. To be sure, the dollar’s value will fall, imposing a balance sheet loss on the People’s Bank of China (PBC, the central bank). But a falling dollar would make it cheaper for Chinese consumers and companies to buy American goods.

If prices are stable in the United States, as is the case now, the gains from buying American goods should exactly offset the PBC’s balance sheet losses.

The downgrade could, moreover, force the US Treasury to raise the interest rate on new bonds, in which case China would stand to gain. But S&P’s downgrade was a poor decision, taken at the wrong time. If America’s debts had truly become less trustworthy, they would have been even more dubious before the agreement reached on Aug 2 by Congress and President Barack Obama to raise the government’s debt ceiling.

That agreement allowed the world to hope that the US economy would embark on a more predictable path to recovery. The downgrade has undermined that hope. Some people even predict a double-dip recession. If that happens, the chance of an actual US default would be much higher than it is today.

 Reason to worry: China’s US$3.2 trillion problem will become a 20-trillion-renminbi problem if China cannot reduce its current account surplus and fence off capital inflows. — AP

These new worries are raising alarm bells in China. Diversification away from dollar assets is the advice of the day. But this is no easy task, particularly in the short term. If the PBC started to buy non-dollar assets in large quantities, it would invariably need to convert some current dollar assets into another currency, which would inevitably drive up that currency’s value, thus increasing the PBC’s costs.

Another idea being discussed in Chinese policy circles is to allow the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar. Much of China’s official foreign reserves have accumulated because the PBC seeks to control the renminbi’s exchange rate, keeping its upward movement within a reasonable range and at a measured pace.

If it allowed the renminbi to appreciate faster, the PBC would not need to buy large quantities of foreign currencies.

International experience

But whether renminbi appreciation will work depends on reducing China’s net capital inflows and current account surplus. International experience suggests that, in the short run, more capital flows into a country when its currency appreciates, and most empirical studies have shown that gradual appreciation has only a limited effect on countries’ current account positions.

If appreciation does not reduce the current account surplus and capital inflows, then the renminbi’s exchange rate is bound to face further upward pressure. That is why some people are advocating that China undertake a one-shot, big-bang appreciation large enough to defuse expectations of further strengthening and deter inflows of speculative “hot” money. Such a revaluation would also discourage exports and encourage imports, thereby reducing China’s chronic trade surplus.

But such a move would be almost suicidal for China’s economy. Between 2001 and 2008, export growth accounted for more than 40% of China’s overall economic growth. That is, China’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate would drop by four percentage points if its exports did not grow at all. In addition, a study by the China Centre for Economic Research has found that a 20% appreciation against the dollar would entail a 3% drop in employment more than 20 million jobs.

There is no short-term cure for China’s US$3.2 trillion problem. The government must rely on longer-term measures to mitigate the problem, including internationalisation of the renminbi. Using the renminbi to settle China’s international trade accounts would help China escape America’s beggar-thy-neighbour policy of allowing the dollar’s value to fall dramatically against trade rivals.

But China’s US$3.2 trillion problem will become a 20-trillion-renminbi problem if China cannot reduce its current account surplus and fence off capital inflows. There is no escape from the need for domestic structural adjustment.

To achieve this, China must increase domestic consumption’s share of GDP. This has already been written into the government’s 12th Five-Year Plan. Unfortunately, given high inflation, structural adjustment has been postponed, with efforts to control credit expansion becoming the government’s first priority. This enforced investment slowdown is itself increasing China’s net savings, i.e., the current account surplus, while constraining the expansion of domestic consumption.

Real appreciation of the renminbi is inevitable so long as Chinese living standards are catching up with US levels. Indeed, the Chinese government cannot hold down inflation while maintaining a stable value for the renminbi. The PBC should target the renminbi’s rate of real appreciation, rather than the inflation rate under a stable renminbi. And then the government needs to focus more attention on structural adjustment the only effective cure for China’s US$3.2 trillion headache. – Project Syndicate

● Yao Yang is Director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.

US Dollar’s Share Of Global Reserves Continues To Slide, Reserve Status Questioned

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Dollar’s Share Of Global Reserves Continues To Slide, Reserve Status Questioned

Jimmy Geithner and Bennie Bernanke have contributed to the dollar’s decline – Getty Images North America.

WASHINGTON – APRIL 21: Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner (L) and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke applaud during the unveiling of the new $100 note in the Cash Room at the Treasury Department April 21, 2010 in Washington, DC. According to the Treasury Department, the U.S. government evaluates advances in digital and printing technology to redesign currency and stay ahead of counterfeiters. The new note will be put into circulation in Feburary 2011.

Further confirmation that the U.S. dollar is gradually losing its reserve status came today from an International Monetary Fund report on global holdings of foreign exchange reserves by central banks.  The greenback, and the euro, lost share vis-à-vis the Japanese yen, the Australian, and the Canadian dollar, pointing to a “slow, gradual diversification” of reserve holdings.

With Christine Lagarde recently appointed General Manager in replacement of the disgraced Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IMF released its latest “Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves” (COMFER) which lists reserves held at central banks in 33 “advanced economies” and 105 “emerging and developing economies.”  China, one of the largest holders of foreign reserves, is not included in the sample. (Read IMF Appoints Lagarde To Fix A Disgraced institution).

Attesting to the continued global loss of confidence in the U.S. dollar, the greenback’s share of the world’s reserve continued to slide in the fourth quarter of 2010, the latest data show.  Interestingly, the trend can be explained entirely by valuation effects, with the trade-weighted dollar depreciating 4%% in that time frame.

The U.S.’ share of allocated reserves fell in the first quarter to 60.69%% from 61.53% from Q4 2010.  Central Bank reserves move slowly, but the slide in the greenback’s share, which Nomura suggests would be even steeper if China was included in the sample, has been very pronounced if one takes a longer-term window.

A year before the latest data, Q1 2010, the greenback’s share stood at 61.64%, while in Q1 2001, ten years before, it stood at 72.3%.  While USDs dominance was unquestioned a few years ago, it is anything but rare to speak of a move toward a multi-currency system, with the dollar still a primus inter pares [first among peers]. (Read Central Banks Dump Treasuries As Dollar’s Reserve Currency Status Fades).

Emerging and developing nations aggressively accumulated foreign reserves in the first quarter, as their high-growth economies attracted massive capital flows from so-called advanced economies.  While rich nations added $65.5 billion in reserves, $1.6 billion of those in U.S. dollars, emerging markets added $366.3 billion, $65.8 billion of those in dollars.  Regardless, EM central banks also sought further diversification, with the Japanese Yen as the main destination.

Emerging market central banks accumulated $6.6 billion in new JPY reserves in the first quarter, taking their allocation up to 2.9%.  “While the increase appears small, it signifies that the yen has recently found favor amongst EM central banks as an alternative safe haven,” noted Nomura.

“Other” currencies, as denominated by the IMF, made up 20% of emerging market reserve accumulation in the first quarter.  With the Canadian and Australian dollars as some of the biggest beneficiaries, the share of “other” currencies climbed up to 5.8%, from 5.1% in Q4 2010.

Euro share of global reserves crawled up a couple of percentage points to 26.6%, despite being shunned by EM central banks (where its share fell to 28.2%).  With the euro gaining 5.8% against the dollar in the first quarter, the data indicates EM’s actively selling euros.  “It is likely that central banks sought to rebalance their reserve portfolios in the wake of EUR strength and corresponding USD weakness. That is, they sold EUR and bought USD and other currencies to counter the sharp change in valuation,” explained Nomura’s analysts.

The IMF’s most recent COFER continues to support the thesis that the U.S. is losing its reserve status.  Central banks are sticking to “relatively stable allocations of major currencies,” namely the U.S. dollar and the euro, yet they are gradually moving away, adding yen and “other” currencies.  While the greenback will continue to play a predominant role in world trade, there can be no doubt that slowly, but surely, central banks will rely less and less on it.

The US’s reckless money-printing could put the world back into crisis!

By Liam Halligan

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Last week, Ben Bernanke suggested that the US base interest rate will stay close to zero for an “extended period”. It’s been there since December 2008.

The US currency has also been falling pretty steadily since the summer of 2010, after Ben Bernanke gave the first inklings he would launch QE2. Photo: AP

Traders took these words to mean that the Federal Reserve won’t hike rates until the first few months of 2012 at the earliest.

Bernanke also pledged to do whatever is required to keep America’s economic recovery on track – confirming that the second programme of “quantitative easing”, or QE2, would be completed. These two related announcements – the “reprieve” and the “sugar rush” – sent Wall Street into renewed spasms of synthetic joy.

In the real world, US growth is slowing sharply. Annualised GDP rose just 1.8pc during the first three months of 2011, down from 3.1pc the quarter before. America remains mired in sovereign, commercial and household debt.

Yet as the Fed chairman spoke, US stocks hit their highest level since before the sub-prime crisis. The tech-heavy Nasdaq, incredibly, closed at a 10-year peak.

So the Fed will keep on “printing” virtual money – at least for now. By the end of June, it will have purchased $600bn (£363bn) of longer-term Treasuries, with the US government effectively buying its own debt from funds created ex nihilo. That’s on top of the original $1,750bn (£1,048bn) QE scheme, launched in late 2008.

America’s base money supply – the bedrock of the world’s reserve currency – has doubled in little more than two years. Despite consternation among many US voters, and dismay – rapidly turning to anger – across the world, most of America’s political elite refuse even to debate QE. Such is the state of democracy in the “land of the free and the home of the brave”. And America is not alone.

Plunging dollar

Bernanke’s utterances caused gold to jump another 2pc. Silver – known as “poor man’s gold”, another “inflation hedge” – spiked 6.5pc. But the real story was the plunging dollar. Against a basket of five major global currencies, the US currency fell sharply and is now at its weakest since July 2008. The Fed’s “real broad dollar index”, a 26-currency composite and adjusted for inflation, is testing levels not seen since 1979.

Yet still Tim Geithner puffed-out his chest and reaffirmed America’s “strong dollar” commitment. “Our policy has been, and will always be, as long as I’m in this job, that a strong dollar is in America’s interest,” the US treasury secretary said.

That’s total nonsense, of course – seeing as a weaker currency boosts US exports and lowers the value of America’s external debt. Geithner’s words are not only disingenuous, but insulting to America’s creditors and trading partners. In fact, Washington’s constant berating of Beijing for “currency manipulation” is looking more and more like a diversion tactic.

 Big statement

That’s a big statement, I know. But it’s based on a dispassionate analysis of the facts. I have no personal beef with America. I’ve spent a sizeable chunk of my life in America and much of my family is American. I love America! I feel the need to write this as quite a few US economists, even those boasting Nobel prizes, have recently accused analysts who don’t toe the “Washington line” of being “America-haters”.

Such ad hominem tactics are pathetic – the last refuge of intellectual cowards who know they’re losing the argument. For the “Washington line” – inflation isn’t a problem, we don’t need to raise rates and the Fed can print willy-nilly – is not only looking increasingly untenable, but is having a severe negative impact on much of the rest of the world.

Damaging relationships

The way the Obama administration is running America’s economy – continued fiscal expansionism, QE2 and “dollar benign neglect” – is not only damaging US relationships abroad, but will ultimately lead to greater pain for domestic voters too. I say this not because I hate America but because, as a citizen of the world, I care about the fate of the largest economy on earth.

This latest dollar weakness is part of a longer-term trend. From the start of 2002 until the middle of 2008, the greenback lost 30pc on a trade-weighted basis. The start of the “sub-prime” crisis proper then sent shock waves around the world. For six months or so, Western investors piled into what they knew, liquidating complex positions and buying “Uncle Sam”. The dollar surged, spiralling upward during the so-called “safe haven rally”.

Then the Fed began QE, apparently to tackle “deflation”. The more pressing need was to bail out Wall Street and rein in the real value of America’s burgeoning government debt – which happened as the dollar then fell. The US currency has also been falling pretty steadily since the summer of 2010, after Bernanke gave the first inklings he would launch QE2.

Massive problem

America’s currency weakness is based on fundamentals including its vast, and upward-spiralling, $14,000bn debt – and that’s just what’s “on the books”. Nothing material is being done to address this massive problem. The unspoken assumption among politicians on both sides of the aisle is that America can just “monetise” its liabilities by continuing to debase the currency.

So the Fed’s actions are undermining the dollar precisely because that’s what the White House wants. At the same time, sophisticated investors are exploiting ultra-low US rates by borrowing cheaply in dollars and switching the proceeds to currencies where returns are higher. This “carry trade” is flooding foreign exchange markets with US currency – weakening the dollar further.

Benign neglect

Yet “dollar benign neglect” is fraught with economic risks. A weak dollar makes commodities more expensive. It was when the greenback hit it’s last trough of $1.60 against the euro in mid-2008 that oil soared to $147 a barrel. Expensive crude damages the world’s biggest oil user. And as the dollar falls, America’s huge commodity imports cost more, making the trade deficit even worse.

America’s currency depreciation trick could also backfire badly if “the rope slips” and, far from a steady decline, the world’s pivotal currency goes into free fall. That would plunge America back into recession, or worse – as inflation ballooned amid soaring import costs, forcing the Fed to raise rates in the teeth of shuddering slowdown.

A plummeting US currency would also spark broader chaos as central banks sought to protect the value of their reserves. And after the inevitable downward overshoot, the dollar would snap back, causing the carry trade to “unwind” as dollar borrowers suddenly owed more. The danger then would be that major losses at financial institutions posed renewed systemic threats. Financial markets might then go into a tailspin, reigniting concerns of a fully-blown global slump.

Waning power

Bernanke’s comments last week were made to the press – with the Fed now agreeing to regularly scheduled news conferences for the first time in its 98-year history. Some say this decision to submit to demands for transparency indicates that the power of the US central bank, it’s global influence, is on the wane.

I’d suggest that, on the contrary, the Fed’s global impact may soon reach an all-time high. And that impact won’t be pretty. For far from being a “safe haven”, an increasingly debased dollar could be the cause of the next global financial crisis.

Reading between the lines of Bernanke’s statement, I don’t think that last week’s Fed missive, as most concluded, confirmed the end of QE2. In my view – and I write this with a sense of trepidation – the Fed’s inaugural “meet the press” moment was in fact preparing the ground for the start of QE3.

Liam Halligan is chief economist at Prosperity Capital Management.

Related Articles

• Obama’s lax dollar is to blame for oil’s spike, not bankers 30 Apr 2011
• US growth slows sharply to 1.8pc28 Apr 2011
• US economy: in graphs  28 Apr 2011
• Fed cuts forecasts for US growth27 Apr 2011
• Fed sees inflation fading: reaction 27 Apr 2011
• America appears to be sleepwalking towards disaster – does no one care? 23 Apr 2011

Dollar Falls against Euro, Ringgit hits new level since Asian financial crisis!

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U.S. Dollar Falls Against The Euro

By Benzinga Staff

The U.S dollar fell further against the Euro Monday, April 25th, just in time for the April 26-27 Federal Open Market Committee meeting, Reuters reports.

This news comes shortly after Standard & Poor shifted the United States AAA credit rating from a stable outlook to a negative one, and the bad news and uncertainty continues for the U.S.

Reuters reports that the main reason for the weak dollar is the Federal Reserve’s loose monetary policy coupled with stagnant interest rates. The European Central Bank is raising interest rates while the U.S. Fed has remained steady.

Last week, the European Central Bank raised its refinancing rate from 1%, a record low, to 1.25%. The U.S. Federal Reserve has kept its main refinancing rate close to zero since December 2008.

The dollar is currently trading at 73.972, only a slight increase from the three-year low of 73.735 reached last week. The Euro is currently at 1.4604, which is very close to the 16-month high of 1.4649 also reached last week.

Market members will be anxiously awaiting the Federal Open Market Committee post-meeting news conference, with hopes of more competitive interest rates to drive up U.S. currency. The internal conflict within U.S government regarding budget deficits and growing debt does not help the dollar either.

Despite the U.S. unemployment rate continuing to decrease, people applying for jobless benefits is still too high and further reinforcing the stagnant low interest rates. At the end of the week of April 9th, the number of applications for unemployment benefits fell from 382,000 to 380,000.

Regardless of the outcome of Federal Open Market Committee meeting, it won’t be a speedy recovery for the dollar. The Federal Reserve expects to slowly recover all of the money initially circulated back in 2008 to help the economy get out of the recession.

According to Reuters, inflation and rising commodity prices are only driving the value of competitor currencies up, with Canadian and Australian dollars hitting multi-year peaks.

Ringgit hits new level since Asian financial crisis

By FINTAN NG  fintan@thestar.com.my

PETALING JAYA: The ringgit closed below 3 to the greenback yesterday, breaking a psychological barrier and hitting a level not seen since the dark days of the Asian financial crisis.

The local currency settled at 2.992 to the US dollar, gaining 2.34% since the beginning of the year and charting another multi-year high.

However, exporters need not fear as its rise has been in tandem with the strengthening of other currencies in the region.

Economists told The Star there would be cause for concern only if the ringgit appreciated more than currencies whose exports competed head-to-head against Malaysia’s.

Better deal: Money changer Kamaruddin Packiry counting US dollar notes at his shop in Ikano Power Centre at Mutiara Damansara yesterday. — GLENN GUAN / The Star

They said investors were now focusing on emerging economies, including Asia’s, given that there was less risk to growth.

They pointed out that the reasons for the better performance of the region’s currencies were expectations of tighter monetary policy due to inflation worries, stronger economic fundamentals and robust demand (compared to developed economies).

When compared with other major currencies, the ringgit had generally weakened since the beginning of the year. The ringgit weakened by 4.06% against the pound and fell by 3.07% versus the Aussie dollar and 2% against the Canadian dollar.

Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd chief economist Azrul Azwar said the ringgit’s rise should not pose many problems for local exporters as long as it was not out of sync with regional currencies.

He believed Bank Negara would continue to intervene in currency markets to ensure “orderly and gradual” movement of the currency.

Affin Investment Bank Bhd economist Alan Tan said compared with the region’s currencies, the greenback’s weakness was largely due to concerns over still unclear US data on housing and jobs, as well as signals from the Federal Reserve that monetary policy would continue to remain easy.

Stronger ringgit not a problem

By FINTAN NG fintan@thestar.com.my

So long as rise in tandem with other regional currencies

PETALING JAYA: An appreciating ringgit will not have as much of an impact on the exports front as long as it strengthens in tandem with other currencies in the region.

Malaysia’s top five export destinations in February were Singapore, China, Japan, the European Union and the United States. These countries were also the top five destinations for exports last year.

Economists told StarBiz that a strengthening ringgit would not be a problem as long as the currency’s movement was synchronised with the region where competitors include Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Malaysia’s competitors in the electrical and electronics (E&E) industry, which made up nearly 40% of total exports last year, include South Korea and Taiwan.

To varying degrees, emerging Asia’s currencies have appreciated against their major trade partners as growth risks faded and the loose monetary policies of the United States and the 17-member eurozone prompt investors to shift their focus to more robust markets.

Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd chief economist Azrul Azwar said the ringgit’s rise should not post much problem for local exporters as long as the currency’s rise was not out of sync with regional currencies.

In any case, economists have pointed out time and again that Bank Negara would continue to intervene in the currency markets to ensure that the ringgit’s movement remained orderly and gradual.

“This has always been the case, Bank Negara will intervene so as to ensure that the ringgit’s movement will not impact the manufacturing sector’s exports-intensive industries,” Azrul said.

He added that part of the reason for the rise of currencies in emerging Asia was due to expectations of tighter monetary policy as inflation fuelled by higher crude oil and commodity prices hit these economies, where demand has been stronger compared to the developed economies.

Affin Investment Bank Bhd economist Alan Tan said there were indications that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would continue to keep US benchmark interest rates low and monetary policy loose.

Filepic: A money changer counts U.S. dollar bank notes and Malasyian ringgit notes for customers in Kuala Lumpur. Economists told StarBiz that a strengthening ringgit would not be a problem as long as the currency’s movement was synchronised with the region where competitors include Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.

“The FOMC members are signalling that the easy monetary policy will continue as jobs and housing remain weak while the first-quarter gross domestic product growth is likely to be softer than the previous quarter,” he said.

The FOMC would release its rate decision on Wednesday while the first-quarter figures would be released on Thursday.

Meanwhile, SMI Association of Malaysia national president Chua Tiam Wee, whose members expect the ringgit to strengthen further, said any rise in the ringgit would have some impact on exporters.

“As trade is mostly conducted in US dollars, exporters will still have to fulfill their orders and absorb the losses,” he said.

Chua added that exporters would just have to be more productive and find ways to mitigate the strengthening ringgit via hedging or source their raw material in a more cost-effective way.

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Making Debt Ratings Count, Downgrades US Bonds!

Making debt ratings count

A QUESTION OF BUSINESS By P. GUNASEGARAN

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S&P’s negative outlook on US bonds may help make rating agencies a wee bit more relevant

Reuters: In this Feb. 14 photo, The National Debt Clock hangs from a building near Times Square in New York.

IS it “better late than never” or “too quick to jump the gun?” That depends, of course, on whom you talk to.

US president Barack Obama will say it is the latter but quite a number of people in the finance industry believe that rating agency Standard and Poor’s negative outlook on US long-term sovereign bonds should have been proclaimed at the start of the world financial crisis in 2008/9.

The US, along with a number of developed countries around the world such as the UK, Australia, Japan, Germany and neighbour Singapore hold an AAA rating for their sovereign long-term bonds.

That simply implies that these countries are the least likely to default on their debts in comparison to other countries.

The US has had its highest rating continuously from the forties. Since the US dollar emerged as the dominant reserve currency – one in which other countries keep their surplus assets – it has a major advantage over most other countries. Its (USA) external debts are in its own currency.

That means that there is hardly any likelihood of default because if the US economy and US government finances are in deep trouble, then all the US government has to do is to put in place measures which will increase the supply of US dollars – printing money to repay its debts. That has other undesirable consequences of course but that’s another story.

For developing countries and even developed countries it is often the case that their external debt is denominated in US dollars or some other reserve currency such as yen or euros and they must earn foreign exchange (that is a surplus of exports to imports of goods, services and capital) to eventually repay these debts. They can’t resort to the printing presses.

When they are in danger of default, the standard prescription is bone-crunching austerity and a steep currency depreciation to make exports more competitive and imports prohibitively expensive so that there is a surplus of reserve funds to repay debts.

Currency depreciation increases the amount of debt in terms of the base currency and therefore such a prescription often leads to prolonged hardship for these countries, as we saw during the Asian financial crisis of 1998. This crippled growth in many Asian countries for years afterwards and resulted in a relative drop in living standards.

So, why does S&P put a negative rating outlook on US long-term bonds when there is little or perhaps, no risk that the US government cannot repay its US dollar debt? That’s a question that is difficult to answer.

Using, S&P’s own definition, “a credit rating is Standard & Poor’s opinion on the general creditworthiness of an obligor.” Its hard to see how such a definition alters anything in terms of the US, even if S&P is now tying its rating to how the US solves its budget deficit problems, unless it is expanding “creditworthiness” to include more than just ability to repay.

For those countries who have substantial US dollar assets in the form of US bonds, bills and other assets, the S&P ratings have hardly mattered at all because all of them know that the US will pay its US dollar obligations and they don’t need the rating agencies to tell them that.

For them they have to make a crucial call on returns – essentially, how much earnings the assets bring in and how the US dollar moves relative to their base currencies.

If the US’ financial position is poor, that will eventually be reflected in the value of its currency. If the US dollar falls like how some Asian currencies did in 1998 and the aftermath, the ratings by agencies such as S&P will count for nought.

Perhaps, that is what is persuading S&P to extend the scope of “general creditworthiness” to something beyond the mere ability to repay a debt. That cannot be a bad thing and one hopes more credit rating agencies will follow suit and show the courage of their convictions and thereby make themselves a wee bit more relevant.

● Managing editor P Gunasegaram thinks that the world is far from making the adjustments needed to prevent a recurrence of the ongoing world financial crisis.

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Who rates the raters ?